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Abstract 
Masseron, M., C. Tollu and J. Vauzeilles, Generating plans in linear logic. 1. Actions as proofs, 
Theoretical Computer Science 113 (1993) 349-370. 
There is an increasing interest in the relation between logic and the changes involved in reasoning 
and, specifically, in plan generation. Up to now, several attempts in this direction have been made, 
either by embedding actions into a classical framework or by using nonstandard formalisms. We 
think that these attempts, though promising, miss their objectives, for a lack of a suitable logic, and 
that the effort must be pursued. In this paper, we show how to obtain a strong and clean 
correspondence between proofs and sequences of actions by using only Girard’s linear logic, 
eliminating from the classical logic the structural rules which are not adapted to our purpose. 
A theorem is presented which expresses the new adequacy between proofs and actions. 
1. Introduction 
The logical characterization of the concepts of action and change has already been 
investigated by many authors (see, for example, [2-4, 161 and the references therein) 
but, while it is relatively easy to represent a sequence of actions by a proof, the 
converse operation has not yet been achieved in a satisfactory way (in spite of many 
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attempts made in order to correct the flows inherent in the logic employed, most of the 
time, a portion of the classical or intuitionistic predicate calculus or some modal logic 
system). The logical systems, as generally used in these works, are static by nature and 
are unable to cope with change. For example, the modal logic, which may seem to be 
the best one to deal with change, cannot do anything without the help of a semantical 
apparatus, the so-called “possible world semantics”, which obviously is an extra 
datum, outside the logic. Even if the latter semantics enjoys good properties, nothing 
enables us to say what its exact relation to the initial problem is, since the only known 
link is the logical translation, which is not regarded as really adequate. Although these 
methods have turned out to be efficient for treating simple problems of planification, 
their lack of flexibility and robustness seems crippling for dealing with more complex 
questions. As a matter of fact, temporal phenomena are appropriately described by 
means of an accurate management of resources, which supposes restrictions on the use 
of tautologies such as A A B*A or Aa.4 A A. That restriction is strikingly necessary, 
as it appears by a simple look at the classical example of the domain: the problem of 
a robot which takes and stacks blocks with a single hand. At the beginning, the hand is 
empty, blocks a and b are on a table and c is on top of b. The application of the 
tautology A A B+A would, for instance, lead to forget that block b is present; the 
application of the tautology Aa.4 A A could make one believe that the robot has two 
hands, at least! The deduction rules responsible for the above tautologies were 
isolated in 1934/35 when Gentzen [S] introduced sequent calculus: they are known as 
contraction and weakening. It had not been realized to what extent classical logic was 
affected by discarding such rules until Girard proposed linear logic [S]. Amongst 
other phenomena, let us just mention the fact that binary conjunction (binary 
disjunction) splits into two distinct connectives, namely, 0 and & (0 and g). In the 
present work, we adopt this position by using an appropriate portion of Girard’s 
linear logic (essentially, the portion corresponding to 0 and O), and we give a proof 
of the equivalence between actions and their assigned proofs: it is indeed possible to 
translate, in a natural way, a proof in our linear theory into a sequence of actions, 
without using any ingredient extraneous to the logical system. 
2. How to specify problems of planification 
We refer the reader to the numerous articles written on the subject for a detailed 
exposition of this point (for example, [2, 61). Our aim is merely to give an accurate 
set-theoretic description of the planification problems considered in this work. 
2.1. Action system 
An action system is designed to act on a system by modifying its state. To describe 
these data, we are given afirst-order language, without a function letter; to put it more 
precisely, 
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l a set of constants, representing the objects we want to act on, and 
l a set of predicates: an occurrence of a closed atomic formula will be called a fact. 
- An action system consists of transition rules: 
where the symbol 1 represents an inner nondeterministic disjunction and, for the 
sake of simplicity, the Ai’S and B, k’~ are facts. Such rules are generally written with 
variables, although we shall use here only the closed variants, obtained by substitu- 
ting constants to the variables. 
- A state of the system is a set of facts. 
2.1.1. Conjunctive action systems 
The conjunctive transition rules, i.e. rules of the previous type with s = 1, correspond 
to deterministic actions. A conjunctive transition rule I+G, where I and G are finite 
sets of facts, has the following interpretation: 
l I is composed of the facts of the initial state which are (actively or passively) 
necessary to carry out the intended action; 
l G is composed of the facts which are generated after the action has been carried out. 
Note that some elements of In G may be passive, i.e. unaffected by the action, and 
play the role of preconditions, but this distinction is meaningless in our work, 
confirming the analogy with the so-called “add lists” and “delete lists” of STRIPS (see 
C161). 
l The facts not contained in lu G are untouched by the action. In the following 
paragraphs, it will be noticeable that the formalization we propose takes into 
account only the “touched” part I u G. We do not have to specify what happens to 
the remaining part; therefore, our treatment provides us with an appropriate 
framework for coping with the famous frame problem [15]. 
2.1.2. Disjunctive action systems 
The disjunctive action rules, i.e. rules of the previous type with s > 0, correspond to 
nondeterministic actions. 
The interpretation of a disjunctive rule is: 
l choose a value for j by a convenient nondeterministic procedure; 
l carry out the action corresponding to this value. 
These two points may depend on each other. 
The natural form of a disjunctive transition rule also involves disjunctions in its left 
member: 
I1 1 ... I I,.-+G,I ... IG, 
(where the Z,‘s and Gj’s are finite sets of facts), but it is easy to realize that such a rule is 
equivalent to a family of rules: 
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In the sequel, we will use families of actions instead of actions in their general form 
because they are easier to handle. 
2.2. Examples 
2.2.1. A conjunctive action system: the blocks world 
The first-order language is defined by three blocks a, b, c and five predicates, 
OTA(x) :x is on the table, 
ON(x> Y) :x is on top of y, 
CL(x) :x is clear, i.e. there is nothing on top of it, 
HOLD(x) : the robot holds x, 
EMPTY : the hand of the robot is empty, 
which are able to characterize the relative positions of the blocks and the state of the 
hand of the robot. 
A state of the system is, for instance (Fig. l), 
{OTA(a), OTA(b), ON(c, a), CL(b), CL(c), EMPTY}. 
An action system associated with this problem is definable from: 
Bake(x): {EMPTY, CL(x), OTA(x)}+{HOLD(x)), 
Remove(x, y) : {EMPTY, CL(x), ON(x, y)} --+ { HOLD(x), 
Put(x): {HOLD(x)}+{EMPTY, CL(x), OTA(x)}, 
WY)l~ 
Stack(x, y): {HOLD(x), CL(y)}+{EMPTY, CL(x), ON(x, Y)}. 
2.2.2. A disjunctive action system: the 3-socks problem 
The socks problem is well-known: we have a heap of at least three socks, either 
black or white, hidden in a dark room. 
The predicates we introduce are the propositional constants HS, BS and WS to 
design, respectively, hidden, black and white socks. 
A state of the system is {HS, HS, HS, . ..} (at least three occurrences). 
Fig. 1. 
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Our action system is: 
Pick:{HS}+{BS}I{WS}, 
IBlackpair : { BS, BS} -+ { OK}, 
VVhitepair: {WS, WS}+{OK), 
OKBSisOK : {OK, BS> +{OK}, 
OKWSisOK : (OK, WS} + { OK}, 
OKOKisOK: {OK, OK}+{OK}. 
Of course, the last three rules are equivalent to the nonsimple rule 
{OK, BS}l{OK, WS}I{OK, OK}+(OK}. 
The challenge is to be “OK”, that is, to pick out enough socks to be sure to obtain 
a one-coloured pair. 
3. Set-theoretic construction of concrete actions 
General remark. We often consider the general (i.e. disjunctive) situation to give the 
definitions and express the properties: the reader is invited to modify them on his own 
to the conjunctive case, which is always simple and interesting. 
Let C be a set of states and SA be an action system, both written in the same 
language. 
Definition 3.1. C and SA are said to be compatible iff, for every aeC and every 
D:I+G,(...IG, of SA: 
IfZGo, thenanG~Zand,foreveryj~{l,...,s},(o-Z)vGjEC 
(where G=Giu...uG,). 
When I s 0 is satisfied, we say that D is manageable w.r.t. g. 
Carrying out D transforms 0 into one of the a; = (g - I) u Gj: the value of j is the 
result of an inner nondeterministic choice. 
An initial state g is an element of a set of states compatible with the action system 
we are studying. 
This definition is simply the expression of a coherence maintenance in accordance 
with our interpretation of the rules. 
In order to define the composition of actions without any reference to a particular 
set of states, we first construct a set DEFACT of “concrete-action candidates”: this 
construction may seem a little pedantic, but a more direct one would be awkward. In 
this construction, we use a disjoint-union operation: XL_ Y is the union of the sets X’ 
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and Y’ obtained by distinguishing, for every A EX n Y, the occurrence of A in X from 
its occurrence in Y. Note that Xu Y=Xu Y iff X n Y=@. 
3.1. DeJinition of DEFACT 
It is done by induction: 
l The identical action (b-+@ is an element of DEFACT. 
l Every transition rule is an element of DEFACT. 
l Framing. Let KD : Z+G, I... 1 G, be an element of DEFACT. 
If XnZ=& D’:XuZ+XuG,~ . ..IXuG. is an element of DEFACT. 
l Composition. Let iE=(IEj:Hj+Kj, 11 ... IKj,rj)je(l,.,,,S) be a family of elements of 
DEFACT indexed like the right member of D: 
The composed E 0 D is dejined if, for every jell, . . . , s}, 
HjnI~G and HjnGSGj 
(the first can be written as Hjnl s Gj in the presence of the second). When defined, 
IE 0 B is the element of DEFACT we now consider: 
_ Special case: If Hj= G, for every j, the conditions are obviously satisfied and we 
define the composed element to be [E 0 D : I + K 1, 1 1 . . . I K, fs (all K, k’s are involved). 
_ The general case can be reduced to the special case by a suitable framing as follows: 
We can carry out the following partitions: Hj is the union of the disjoint sets 
Yj= HjnG and Xj= Hj- Yj, and Gj is the union of the disjoint sets Yj and 
Zj=Gj- Yj. NOW, let X=X1 u ..’ uX, and Tj=X-Xj. We have XnI=@ and 
Xn G = 0, so, we can frame D with X to obtain 
Observing the fact that, for a given j, the sets Xi, Yj, Zj and Tj are mutually disjoint, 
we can frame [Ej with Zju Tj to obtain 
E>:(ZjUTj)U(XjU Yj)+K;,lI ...IKi,,j, where KJ,,=(ZjUTj)LIKj,k. 
As E> can also be written as 
I [EI:XUGj~K;,II’..IKj,lj, 
we are brought back to the special case: let [E’ be the family (EJ)j; we define the 
composed element [E 0 D of DEFACT to be 
IE’ 0 114’ : X u Z+K;, 1 I . . . I K:, f,, where all K>. k’s are involved. 
An interesting situation is when [E’ is the identical action, except for a valuej, ofj (as 
is always the case in the conjunctive situation): we let the reader work out this case and 
recover the general composition from the particular one. In practice, this particular 
case is very useful. 
This ends the definition of DEFACT. 
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Composition of elements of DEFACT. Let ID, be as given above and IE : H+K 1 1. . .I K, 
be another element of DEFACT. With the intention of constructing an element of 
DEFACT by composition, we define the family ~‘=(~s)j by EJ= iE for every 
jE{l, . ..) s}: the composed [E’ 0 D, whenever defined (i.e. when H nl E G and 
H n G E Gj), is the element of DEFACT that we aimed at considering; let us denote it 
by [E*D. 
Definition 3.2. D and [E as above are said to be independent iff 
HnI=HnG=InK=GnK=@. 
Note that then lE* D and D l [E are both defined and equal. 
3.2. The adequacy of DEFACT 
With the previous notations, suppose we have an initial state CJ: 
l The framing is meaningful only when X c a-l, i.e. when X is part of the “frame”. 
l The so-called disjoint union Xu Y is meaningful only when the sets X and Y are 
disjoint, because, inside Xu Y, the elements of Xn Y are dangerously “schizo- 
phrenic.” 
Indeed, DEFACT is satisfactory, thanks to the following proposition, which states 
how to extend the definitions of compatibility and manageability to the elements of 
DEFACT. 
Proposition 3.3. For every state OEZ and every element D : I-G11 .‘. 1 G, in DEFACT, 
if Zco: 
(a) every symbol u in the construction of D can be replaced by a u; 
(b) ifG=Gi u 1’. uG,, we haveanGEl and(o-I)vGj~Zforeveryj~{l,...,s). 
When the condition I G o is satisjied, we say that D is manageable (w.r.t. o). 
(c) iE0 D is manageable w.r.t. o iffsm, is manageable w.r.t. a and each IEj is manageable 
w.r.t. ai=(a-Z)uGj. 
The demonstrations are to be done by induction. 
From now on, we suppose that we have a set of states C compatible with the action 
system we are studying. This hypothesis implies that we are considering “realistic” 
action systems, but we say nothing about the existence of such a set! In practice, we 
suppose that we have an initial state a; other elements of Z are then reached by 
carrying out the actions of the system. 
Definition 3.4. A concrete action is an element of DEFACT which is manageable w.r.t. 
an element of C. 
For the sake of clarity and homogeneity of the vocabulary, we shall call what is 
usually referred to as an action an elementary action and a sequence of (family of) 
element actions, a concrete action. 
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Two cases of independence. Let ID and IE be concrete actions: 
_ if E* D is defined and manageable, and GnH= 8, then D and E are independent; 
_ if D and E are manageable w.r.t. the same state, and I nH =8, then D and E are 
independent. 
The demonstrations are easy. 
These cases of independence are important for the demonstration of the complete- 
ness property of planification. They mean essentially that parallelism phenomena are 
taken into account by our definitions, i.e. the “concrete action” 
D//lE:ZuH+(G, u&)1 ... I(G,uK,), 
which would have been defined when In H = 8, is not a new one, but is equal to the 
composition of D and E in an arbitrary order. 
3.3. An abstract example 
Let us consider an example which does not have any concrete interpretation but 
simply illustrates the constructions of the present section. The language is purely 
propositional; the action system is: 
Act1 : {A, A’}+(B), 
&A: (A,}+{&, B;}I{C}, 
Act3:{B,B,,B,}~{D}I{E}, 
Act4: {B}-+(F, F’}, 
and the initial state is the ad hoc set {A, A’, A,, B,}. 
Act 1 and Act2 are independent; so, we have Act 1 l Act2 = Act2 0 Act 1. The latter is 
an easy “conjunctive” composition. By framing, we have 
Actl’: {A, A’, A1}+(A1, B}, 
A&z’: {A,, B)+{B, B1, B;}l{B, C}, 
which are directly composable to give 
D=Act2oActl:{A, A’, A,}+{B,B1,B;}~{B, C}. 
We now want to compose D with the family (Act3, Act4), for which the composability 
conditions are obviously satisfied. With the notations of the definition, we have 
X = {B,}, Zr u T1 = {B; } and Zz u T, = {Bz, C} and successive framings give 
D’: {A, A’, Al, B,}+{B, Br, B;, &}I {B, B,, C}, 
Act?: {B, BI, B;, B,)-t{B;, D)I(B;, E}, 
Act4’: {B, B2, C}-+(B,, C, F, F’}, 
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from which the composed action is directly calculable: 
4. Linear theories 
The deductive system is a linear sequent calculus, similar to the one introduced by 
Gentzen [S]: this tool has for long proved to be extremely efficient in proof theory, but 
it remains somewhat unpopular among potential users such as computer scientists or 
even logicians. For a textbook presentation of Gentzen’s sequent calculus, see [7] or 
[lo]; one may also consult the Appendix in [13] to have a demonstration of the cut 
elimination theorem as cited below. 
In the Appendix we present the “purely linear” part of (intuitionistic) linear logic, 
from which we will extract our proof-theoretic basis. The expressive power of this 
system is limited, as shown by the cut elimination theorem, but it is well adapted to the 
questions we have in mind in this paper; for a more complete one, involving bounded 
operator 6 for contraction and weakening, we refer the reader to [l 11: this operator 
can certainly be used in planification for situations more complex than those we are 
presently interested in. 
4.1. Presentation of a linear sequent calculus 
A sequent is an expression of the form r t--A, where r and A are finite sets of 
occurrences of formulae of the considered language: the order of the elements is 
immaterial, but two occurrences of the same formula are regarded as distinct (one 
often talks of “multisets” in this context); on the other hand, the same occurrence of 
a given formula may appear simultaneously in two distinct multisets (see, for instance, 
the identity group). A set {A} composed of a single formula is simply written as A, and 
a comma indicates disjoint union, for example, the notation “r, A” supposes r n A = 8 
and is an abbreviation for Tu A. For the sake of simplicity, we shall often write 
“formula” instead of “occurrence of a formula”, but this will never be ambiguous as far 
as an element of a sequent is concerned. We limit ourselves to sequents with only one 
formula on the right-hand side, in the spirit of intuitionistic logic. 
Every rule or axiom contains active formulae; they are the ones on which the rule 
eflectively acts, and we have underlined them. We will explicitly indicate the active 
formulae only when necessary. In each sequent, the nonactive formulae constitute the 
context; managing the context is an important part of the rule. 
Remarks. (a) The relation “A E B is provable” is reflexive (because A k A is provable 
for any A) and transitive (because of the cut rule); thus, “A t-B and B t-A are 
provable” is an equivalence relation over the set of all formulae. Modulo this 
equivalence: 
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Identity group 
(Axiom) 4 FA (for any atomic A) 
(Cut) 
I-t-A A,/Jt-B 
r,AFB 
Multiplicative conjunction 0 and 1 group 
(l-r) EI 
Additive disjunction @ group 
I- A BI-C 7 -3 _ 
r,A@B!-C 
(0-l) 
I-EA 
r, It-A (1-l) 
- “A k B is provable” dejines a partial ordering; 
_ the set offormulae equipped with (0, 1) can be considered a commutative monoid; 
- 0 is associative and commutative; 
- @ is distributive w.r.t. 0. 
These purely algebraic properties will be used freely throughout the paper; for 
example, we may often assume that a formula is in the (disjunctive normal) form of 
a “sum of monomials”, but we must stress that we are interested only in the proofs. 
(b) A 0 B is correctly interpreted as the simultaneous presence of A and B. We, 
therefore, get a conjunction in a very strong sense: as a matter of fact, one cannot 
generally prove A @ B k A. 
The meaning of the O-1 rule is simply: “a comma written on the left-hand side of 
a sequent is the same as a 0” (a contrario, we limit the right-hand side to contain only 
one formula because a comma on this side would be the same as a p, that is not the 
convenient disjunction; cf. [S]). 
It must be noted that the sequent AI, . . , A,,, t-B means that B is a linear conse- 
quence of A, @ ... 0 A,,,. Our paper can be viewed as an attempt at explaining this 
notion of linear consequence in terms of actions. 
(c) A @ B is a disjunction, with an exclusive meaning which will be stressed later. 
Classical properties like A k A @ B and A @ A t A are provable. 
4.2. Linear theories 
The theories we shall study in this work will be expressed in a language composed 
of free variables, constants and predicates. The logical symbols are those we have just 
introduced. A closed sequent is a sequent exclusively composed of closed formulae. 
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A linear theory contains two sets of proper axioms, which are all closed sequents: 
(1) The current state axioms are occurrences of closed atomic formulae, the current 
state axiom corresponding to A being written as t A. 
(2) The transition axioms correspond to the actual action system. 
Every transition axiom is a closed sequent Ai, . . . , A, EB, where 
-A 1, . . . , A,,, are atomic formulae, 
_ B is a formula of the language, written as a sum of monomials. 
The set of transition axioms is closed under substitution of a tuple of constants for 
another. 
A proof of a sequent S in such a theory is a proof in the usual meaning of sequent 
calculus, with S as its end-sequent (cf. the Appendix) and managing the current state 
axioms in a niggardly way: in each rule, this management is copied exactly from the 
management of the contexts. More accurately, one employs the following definition. 
Definition 4.1. A proof D of the sequent S, and the set AU(D) of the current state axioms 
it uses are defined by the following inductive clauses: 
(1) A current-state axiom t-A is a proof D of this sequent, with AU(D)= {A}. 
(2) A logical axiom (identity axiom, l-r) or a transition axiom is a proof D of the 
sequent expressing this axiom, with AU(D)=@. 
(3) If D is a proof of S, then the application of a unary (i.e. one-premise) rule (O-1, 
l-1, @_rl, @_r2) with premise S and conclusion S’ gives a proof D’ of S’ with 
AU(D’) = AU(D). 
(4) If D and E are proofs of S and T, respectively, such that AU(D)n AU(E)=o, 
then an application of the cut rule or of the O-r rule with premises S and T, and 
conclusion S’, gives a proof D’ of S’ with AU(D’) = AU(D) u AU(E). 
(5) If D and E are proofs, of S and T, respectively, such that AU(D) = AU(E), then 
an application of the 0-1 rule with premises S and T, and conclusion S’, gives a proof 
D’ of S’ with AU(D’)=AU(D)= AU(E). 
The inductive definition of the proofs enables us to use, to a large extent, construc- 
tions or demonstrations by induction, which we shall designate by the expression 
induction on proofs; for instance, 
Definition 4.2. The height h(D) of a proof D is defined, by induction on proofs, in the 
following way: 
- h(D) = 0 when D is an axiom; 
- h(D) = h(E) + 1 when D is obtained from E by application of a unary rule; 
- h(D)=sup(h(E), h(F)) + 1 when D is obtained from E and F by application of an 
additive binary rule (i.e. O-1); 
- h(D) = h(E) + h(F) + 1 when D is obtained from E and F by application of another 
binary (i.e. two-premises) rule. 
All demonstrations in this work are done (or are to be done) by induction on the 
proofs or on the height of the proofs. 
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From now on we shall denote by D=S the fact that D is a proof of the sequent S. 
The following lemma is useful to characterize the proofs in a linear theory. 
Lemma 4.3. Let r be a finite subset of the initial state, and B a closed formula; then 
(a) D + rkB, with AU(D)=@ and 
(b) D’ * I-B, with AU(D’)=T 
are equivalent forms of proofs. 
The precise result is the following: 
Let D =- r E B and AEAU(D); then there exists D’ = A, r F B such that AU(D’) 
=AU(D)- {A}. A converse transformation can be obtained by applying the cut rule 
between D’ and the current-state axiom I-A. 
It is easily provable. 
Every D =z. r F-B can, thus, be “normalized” in the following way: 
~ a proof D’ 3 AU(D), r F B, with AU(D’)=@ by Lemma 4.3, 
_ then, by applications of the cut rule, D” 5 F F B, with AU(D”) = AU(D). 
The niggardly use of the current state axioms is, in this case, perfectly clear: they are 
used at most once and as late as possible! 
Definition 4.4. A formal action is a proof D * AI, . . . , A,,, I-B, satisfying the follow- 
ing conditions: 
_ AU(D) = 0; 
_ the set of occurrences of formulae {A,, . . . , A,} is a subset of the set of current-state 
axioms: in particular, all Ai are closed and atomic; 
_ B is any closed formula. 
Remarks. The transition axioms are formal actions. 
Lemma 4.3 actually means that a formal action AI, . . . , A, k B is equivalent to 
aD’ * t-BsuchthatAU(D’)={A,,..., A,}, whose intuitive meaning is to consume 
A 1, ... 3 A, and produce B that is an updating of the linear theory. Let us insist once 
more on the fact that the lack of contraction and weakening is responsible for this 
possibility. 
The definition uses Lemma 4.3(a) because it is simpler to handle than form (b); on 
the other hand, (b) is closer to the STRIPS spirit. 
There is no condition on B but it is more readable when written in a normal form (a 
sum of monomials), thanks to the distributivity property, that is, the provability of 
sequents like 
X@(Y@Z)k(XO Y)O(XOZ) and 
(X0 Y)o(x@z)~xo(Yoz). 
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4.3. Cut elimination theorem 
Gentzen’s “Hauptsatz” [S] (discussed in [7]), which one adapts to the system 
presented in the Appendix, can be stated as follows: 
Let T be a linear theory and S a sequent written in the language of T; then, for each 
proof D of S, one can construct a proof D’ of S, all the active formulae of the cut rules 
of which belong to proper axioms of T (such cuts are called proper cuts). 
Moreover, AU(D’) = AU(D) and h(D’) < h(D). 
This property of the height is peculiar to this part of linear logic (in the original case, 
where there are weakening and contraction rules, the height of the proof grows 
dramatically during the cut elimination process). 
It might seem useless to write proofs containing logical cuts, that we later get rid of, 
but cut properly is the “composition operation” of proofs, which is of fundamental 
interest! It is nonetheless possible to draw a natural and useful consequence from the 
preceding theorem; this consequence is known as the subformula property: One 
observes, in every rule except for the cut rule, that each formula appearing in a premise 
sequent is a subformula of a formula appearing in the conclusion sequent (A is 
a subformula of itself, A and B are subformulae of A @ B, . ..). Therefore, if a theory 
uses a given set of logical operators, the other operators of linear logic can be 
discarded from all proofs. We use this property for the sets { 0, 1, @} and { 0, l}. 
5. Planification 
Disjunctive planification is dealt with in the framework of the linear theories defined 
on the logical symbols 0, 1, 0 and conjunctive plantfication in the framework of the 
linear theories defined on the logical symbols @ and 1. The cut elimination theorem, 
thus, enables us to limit ourselves, as for the logical rules, strictly to the ones 
concerned with these symbols; from now on, we shall speak of linear theories and 
conjunctive linear theories. 
We are now ready to translate the concrete actions into formal ones in a complete 
and sound manner. The first step is to define a correspondence between an action 
system and a linear theory: 
l the language is unchanged; 
l a fact A of the state becomes a state axiom F-A; 
0 a transition rule 
becomes a transition axiom 
A l,...,*,t(B1,lO...OB1,.l)O...O(B,,lO...OB,,.~). 
The soundness is clear at this level! The aim of this section is to extend the 
correspondence to all the concrete actions. 
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5.1. E.xamples of linear theories 
5.1.1. The blocks world theory (cJ Section 2.2.1) 
- The language we shall use contains three distinct constants a, b, c and five predi- 
cates: OTA(x), ON(x, y), CL(x), HOLD(x), EMPTY. 
~ The transition axioms are all closed sequents obtained from the following by 
substituting constants for the variables: 
Take(x):EMPTY, CL(x), OTA(x) F HOLD(x), 
Remove(x, y):EMPTY, CL(x), ON& y) t-HOLD(x) @ CL(y), 
Put(x):HOLD(x) I-EMPTY @ CL(x) @ OTA(x), 
Stack(x, y):HOLD(x), CL(y) t-EMPTY @ CL(x) @ ON&y). 
~ The current-state axioms. 
tOTA( +OTA(b), FON(c, a), t-CL(b), FCL(c), FEMPTY 
correspond to the already mentioned initial state. 
5.1.2. The 3-socks theory (cJ Section 2.2.2) 
- The language contains four propositional constants HS, WS, BS and OK. 
~ The transition axioms are 
Pick :HS F BS @ WS, 
Blackpair : BS, BS F OK, 
Whitepair: WS, WS F OK, 
OKBSisOK :OK, BS I- OK, 
OKWSisOK : OK, WS t OK, 
OKOKisOK : OK, OK F OK. 
Of course, the last three axioms may be resumed by 
OK,BS@WS@OKl--OK. 
- The current state: FHHS, t HS, F HS, . . . corresponds to the existence of at least 
three hidden socks. 
5.1.3. The abstract example (c$ Section 3.3) 
- The language contains propositional constants denoted by capital letters. 
- The transition axioms are 
Axl: A, A’FB, 
Ax2: A, F(B, @II;) @ C, 
Ax3: B, B1, Bz FD @ E, 
Ax4: BkF@F’. 
- The current-state axioms are t A, t-A’, t A,, F B,. 
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Theorem 5.1. Let T be a linear theory. Every concrete action can be represented by 
a formal action and, conversely every formal action can be interpreted as a concrete 
action. 
Completeness property. Every concrete action can be represented by a formal action. 
Proof. We prove it by induction on the number of elementary actions performed in 
order to achieve the concrete action. 
If this number is 0, the formal action is the axiom F 1; otherwise, let us consider the 
concrete action IE 0 D as described in Section 3: 
Conjunctive case: By induction hypothesis, D and IE can be represented, respect- 
ively, by 
D =a AI,... ,&I-B1 0 ... @B”, E = Cl,..., C,tD. 
Let us set G={B1 ,..., B,} and H={Ci ,..., C,}. If [E 0 ID, is defined, H is the union of 
the disjoint sets Y= H n G and X = H - Y. Giving new indices to the Bj’S and the C,‘s 
if necessary, this defines 
X= {C,, . . . , C,} and Y= {B,, . . . , I$}. 
The formal action corresponding to [E 0 D must, therefore, prove the sequent. 
(*) Ai ,...) A,,C1)...) C,FDOB,+i@...@B,. 
We now construct such a formal action: 
- Starting with E, a repeated use of the O-r rule with the identity axioms for 
B q+l,...rBn gives 
E’ = B1 ,..., B,,B,+l ,..., L&C1 ,..., C,kD@B,+l@...@B,. 
Then a repeated use of the O-1 rule beginning with E’ gives 
E” * B1O...@B,,C, ,..., C,l-D@B,+l@...@B, 
- By applying the cut rule between D and E” with main formula BI @ ... 0 B,, we 
obtain a proof of the sequent (*), which is the formal action we sought. 
General case: If D a A,, . . . , A, l-B1 @ ... 0 B, represents D and the family of 
s formal actions Ej 3 C, r, . . . , C, PJ t Dj represents the family [E of concrete actions, 
let us have a look at [E 0 D. Let us set 
Gj={B, 1, ... > Bj,nj}, 
G=Giu ... UC,, 
Hj={C, 1, ... > Cj,pj}. 
if [E is manageable after carrying out D, then G n Hj E Gj, and Hj is the union of the 
disjoint sets Yj = Hjn G and Xj = Hj- Yj, for every jE ( 1, . . . , s}. The reader will easily 
build, using the Ej’S, a proof 
E’ =+ B1 @ ... @ B,, C;, . . . , C; t-D’, 
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where { Ci, . . . , C:} is the union of the Xj’s and D’ is the disjunction of the developed 
form of the formulae Dj 0 Bj, 1 0 ... @ B>, tj, where (Bj, r, . . . , BJ, r,} = Gj- Yj. A cut 
between D and E’, with Bi @ ... @ B, as its cut formula, gives a proof of the sequent 
A 1, ... 9 A,, C’, , . . , C: k D’, which is a satisfactory formal action. 
Soundness property. Every formal action represents a concrete action. 
We need the following technical results, based on the fact that the left members of 
the axioms we manipulate contain only atomic formulae. 
Lemma 5.2. For every D * A @ B, r k C, there exists a D’ +- A, B, r EC such that 
AU(D’) = AU(D) and h(D’) < h(D). 
Lemma 5.3. Zf D * A @ B, r k C then there exist E =z- A, l-k C and F = B, 
r E C such that AU(E) = AU(F) = AU(D), h(E) < h(D) and h(F) < h(D). 
Let us come to the demonstration of the soundness property. Let D be a formal 
action without a logical cut. We shall associate with it a concrete action by induction 
on its height as follows: 
~ If D is an axiom, the concrete action is immediately known: it is 4-4 or {A} +{ A} 
in the case of a logical axiom and, in the case of a proper axiom, it is the elementary 
corresponding action. 
_ If the last rule applied is a O-r rule, D has the following form: 
E 3 Al ,..., A,EB F * A,+1 ,..., A,EC 
Al ,..., A,,A,+l ,..., A,t-BBOC 
(0 --r). 
The induction hypothesis applies to E and to F: the concrete action associated with 
D is the concrete action associated with E, followed by the concrete action 
associated with F (the order does not matter in this case: the mutual independence 
of [E and [F is a consequence of the management of contexts in the O-r rule). 
- If the last rule of D is a O-r, 
then the concrete action associated with D is the one associated with E by the 
induction hypothesis. 
_ If the last rule is a proper cut, D has the following form: 
E =+ Al ,..., A,kB F =+ A,+1 ,..., A,,BEC 
A l,...,Ap,Ap+l,...,Am~C 
(cut). 
Conjunctive case. Let B = B1 0 ... @ B,; by repeated applications of Lemma 5.2, we 
have F’ => A,+1 ,..., A,,,, B1 ,..., B, I- C, which is a formal action such that h(F’) < 
h(F). One can apply the induction hypothesis to E and F’: the succession, in this order, 
of the concrete action associated with E and of the concrete action associated with F’ 
is the concrete action we sought. 
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More generally, B is a formula appearing in some transition axiom, that is, B is 
a sum of monomials Bi @ ... @ B,. 
The induction hypothesis gives us a concrete action [E represented by E. Now, 
repeated applications of Lemma 5.3 (first applied to F), followed by repeated applica- 
tions of Lemma 5.2 combined with the induction hypothesis yield a family of concrete 
actions ([Fj)j. We check that this family can be composed with [E so that we can assign 
the result of that composition to D. 
This ends the demonstration of the soundness property. 
6. Examples 
Let us illustrate the theorem on our familiar examples: we give the completeness 
part and invite the reader to work out the soundness of the formal action we obtain. 
6.1. The blocks world 
Figure 2 shows a formal action, in the linear theory presented at the beginning, 
corresponding to the following sequence of elementary actions: 
Remove(c, a), &t(c), Take(b), Stack(b, a); 
moreover, since it demonstrates the sequent 
EMPTY, CL(c), ON(c, a), CL(b), OTA(b) E 
EMPTY 0 CL(b) 0 ON(b, a) @ CL(c) @ OTA(c), 
the final state is described by EMPTY, CL(b), ON(b, a), CL(c), OTA(c), along with 
OTA(a), which has not been modified. 
In the sequel, we give only hints for constructing the desired formal action. 
EMPTY. CL@). OTA(b) I- JiQ!&?W m, CL(a) I- EMPTY@CL(b)OON(b.a) 
CL(c) I- CL(c) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . .._ __.__ ____ _____ . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ____(c”,) 
EMPTY, CL(b), OTA(b). CL(a) I- EMPTYbCL(b)BON(b.a) 
OTA(c) I- OTA(c) 
_....._. _ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . _ (@+ 
EMPTY, CL(b). OTA(b). CL(a), CL(c) I- EMPTYBCL(b)@ON(b.a)@CL(c) 
. ..__.............................................. ..___..................................................... ~..~ _........................... (@+r) 
EMPTY. CL(b), OTA(b). CL(a), !Z!&. OTA(c) I-- EMPTYBCL(b)@ON(b.a)OCL(c)@OTA(c) 
EMPTY, CL@). OTA(b), CL(a), CL(cl@OTA(c I- EMPTYBCL(b)BON(b.a)OCL(c)@OTA(c)’- ” 
HOLD(c) I- EMFTYBCL(c)QO cc) 
TA EMPTV L.~ . . . . ETA . . . . . ...! . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . _______(@_,) 
8C (c)@O ( CL(b), OTA(b), CL(a) I-EMPTYWL(b)@ON(b,a)OCL(c)@OTA(c) 
. . . . . . . .._.............................................. ._... T! . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ._._......................................... @“t) 
HOLD(cl. CL(b), OTA(b). U I-EMPTY@CL(b)‘SON(b.a)@CL(c)@OTA(c) 
EMPTY. CL(c), ON(w) I- HOLD(cK3CLk4 HOLDfc)@CLk& CL(b). OTA(b) I- EMPTYBCL(b)@ON(b.a)BCL(c)OOTA(c) 
(8-U 
EMmY, CL(c). ON(w). CL(b). OTA@) I- EMPTY@CL(b)QON(b.a)BCL(c)@OTA(c) 
(cut) 
Fig. 2. Example of a formal action in the blocks world. 
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We will Pick and pair when possible: 
By applying @_r to Pick and Pick, and cutting with a distributivity proof and 
a proof of a sequent of the form A @ A I-A, we obtain a proof of HS, HS FBI, 
where B1 =(BS 0 BS) @ (BS @ WS) @ (WS 0 WS); a first pairing attempt is an 
easy proof of B1 /--OK 0 (BS 0 WS), which gives us a formal action by a cut 
Pick, =F= HS, HS t-OK @ (BS 0 WS). 
Pick2 is not always OK; so, Pick again by an application of 8-r to these two 
proofs and plain cuts, we have a proof of HS, HS, HS k B2, where 
&=(OK@BS)@(OK@WS)@(BS@BS@WS)@(BS@WS@WS). 
A second pairing attempt, followed by an OKisOK family, produces a proof of 
B2 k OK, which, by a cut, gives 
Pick3 * HS, HS, HS t-OK. 
Remarks. The nonidentification of distinct occurrences of e.g. HS is clearly the key of 
the previous proof! 
We observe the emergence of a rudimentary arithmetics, but once again it is not an 
extraneous tool but a natural by-product of the formal actions. 
The axioms OKisOK resemble the results of weakenings of the identity axiom 
OK t-OK and are not niggardly at all. If one wants to obtain more than one pair, it is 
necessary to modify these axioms! 
6.3 Abstract example 
The formal action corresponding to the concrete one described previously can be 
constructed as follows: 
l An application of the @_r rule to Axl: 
A,A’EB A,E(B,@B;)@C 
A,A’,A,EB@((B,@B;)@C)’ 
Ax2 gives us a formal action E as 
l An application of @_r rule to Ax3 and the identity axiom B; I-B;, followed by an 
application of the 0-1 rule, gives a proof 
Ax3 =G= B,B,@B;,B,i-BB;@(D@E). 
l From Ax4 we obtain easily 
Ax4 =c= B, Ba, C E B2 @ C @ F @ F’. 
l By applications of @- rules to Ax3’ and Ax4, we obtain 
F 3 B,,B@((B,@B;)@C)+((B;@(D@E))@(B,@C@F@F’). 
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l The last operation is a cut between E and F, 
which produces the desired formal action. 
The formal action is easier to understand when its right-hand member is developed: 
7. Conclusion 
We dealt with a well-delineated domain of planning and, thanks to linear logic, gave 
it an adequate logical characterization so as to solve the completeness and soundness 
problems. Although this domain may appear restricting at a first glance, it seems that 
it includes most of the examples in the literature on plan analysis and gives rise to 
important questions, which are quite satisfactorily handled by the formalism we 
propose. On the other hand, we hope that our work contributes to a deeper intuitive 
understanding of linear logic. 
In Part II (i.e. [15]) the elimination of redundant information from the proofs, by 
a method adapted from that of Girard’s proof nets [S], leads to a geometric descrip- 
tion of actions: the diagrams so obtained will be similar to those of Bibel Cl], but they 
will be given an orientation (which essentially comes from the nonsymmetry of the cut 
rule) which will turn out to be the key of a soundness-completeness theorem. 
Appendix. Linear sequent calculus 
Identity group 
(Axiom) A FA 
Multiplicative group 
(l-r) F-1 
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Additive group 
(T-r) rt1 r, 0 k A (O-l) 
Quantijiers group 
r,~kc r,Bw 
r,A@src 
(O-1) 
r,Akc 
r,wkc (&_ll) 
r,pc 
r, A&BFC 
(&_12) 
r, A[u] t-L? 
r, A xA[x] EB (A-1) 
rFA[u] 
(V-r) - 
r,AkB 
rk VxA[x] r,VxAtB ( V-1) 
Conditions. x is not free in the conclusion of the A _r and V-l rules. In the A-l and 
V-r rules, u is a term of the language (in our case, it is either a constant or a variable). 
Note: The identity axiom is restricted to atomic formulae. In fact, AE A is provable 
for every formula, from the atomic case. 
Definition A.l. A proof D of a sequent S, denoted by D * S, is a tree-like object 
defined inductively: 
- An axiom is a proof. 
- If E a T is a proof and if p is a unary rule with T as its premise and S as its 
conclusion, then the application of p to E is a proof of S: 
E=T 
(P) 7’ 
- If E a T and F + U are proofs and if p is a binary rule with T and U as its premises 
and S as its conclusion, then the application of p to E and F is a proof of S: 
(P) 
E*T F*U 
s . 
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The rule of exchange, 
l-, A, B, A k C 
I’,B,A,AFC’ 
which is necessary when sequents are composed of sequences of formulae, is of no use 
for us since we work with sets. 
The fundamental diference between the present system and a nonlinear one is the 
absence of the following structural rules: 
(weakening) s, (contraction) 
r, A, AFB 
2 I-,AkB ’ 
The reader who is familar with sequent calculus can easily verify that, in the presence 
of these two rules, the additive group and the multiplicative group are equivalent. He 
then will realise that it is not possible to eliminate the use of these rules without being 
compelled, at the same time, to split the connectors. To see why it is effectively the lack 
of these rules which perfectly runs linear logic in planification problems, it suffices to 
add the corresponding steps to the demonstrations by induction and to find out the 
damages! 
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